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Chapter 1
Lessons from Behavioral Finance for
Retirement Plan Design
Olivia S. Mitchell and Stephen P. Utkus
Participant-directed deﬁned contribution (DC) plans have become the
cornerstone of the private-sector retirement system around the world. In the
United States, participant choice has spread not only to pensions, but also to
a great many other aspects of the employee beneﬁt package as well, including
healthcare plans, ﬂexible beneﬁt programs, and time-off arrangements. The
trend toward giving participants more choice also underlies recent proposals
to reform Social Security by adding personal accounts, and Medicare propos-
als to permit seniors to choose whether they want a public versus a privately
managed healthcare plan. Participant-managed DC plans are the main fea-
ture of national pension reforms already implemented in many Latin
American nations, as well as in Germany, Sweden, and most recently, Russia.
Underlying this global movement spurring participant choice is an
implicit assumption about behavior: That the employee–citizen to whom
the responsibility of choice has been handed is a well-informed economic
agent who acts rationally to maximize his self-interest. To this end, it is
assumed that he can interpret and weigh information presented regarding
options offered by employers and governments, appropriately evaluate and
balance these choices, and then make an informed decision based on a
weighing of the alternatives.
Recently, however, a different perspective has emerged regarding how
“real” people make economic decisions, one developed by social scientists
working at the interface of economics, ﬁnance, psychology, and even sociol-
ogy. This perspective is consistent with the fundamental economic proposi-
tion that people can and do try to maximize their self-interest, but it
also recognizes that such decisions are often made with less-than perfect
outcomes. In the real world, peoples’ decisions are subject to “bounded
rationality,” as Herbert Simon called it (Simon, 1955). Certain types of
decisions and problems may be simply too complex for individuals to 
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master on their own. There is also what Mullainathan and Thaler (2000)
call “bounded self-control”—individuals have the right intentions or beliefs,
but they lack the willpower to carry out the appropriate changes in behav-
ior. And last, there is the problem of “bounded self-interest” or “bounded
selﬁshness” (Mullainathan and Thaler, 2000). This acknowledges that many
people do seek to maximize their personal welfare, yet they prove far more
cooperative and altruistic than economic theory predicts they will be.
These new notions of how people make decisions have spurred the
rapidly growing ﬁelds of behavioral economics and ﬁnance. The central ques-
tion addressed by this research is how markets work and how consumers
make decisions when some (or even many) people labor under such men-
tal or emotional constraints and complications.1 This research is having a
profound impact on the way analysts now view varied aspects of economic
and ﬁnancial life, including the ways in which we understand how people
decide to save, invest, and consume.2 The goal of the present chapter is to
evaluate key aspects of this new behavioral research in the light of what it
tells us about better ways to design and manage retirement systems. In what
follows, therefore, we analyze what insights this literature offers us on how
workers decide to save, how they manage their retirement investments, and
ultimately how they decide to draw down their assets in retirement. Our
aim, in particular, is to understand how workers and retirees might deviate
from the rational, all-knowing economic agents that underpin economic
theory and often retirement plan design. Finally, we discuss implications of
this literature for plan sponsors and policymakers who must design, regu-
late, and evaluate the institutions that help provide for economic security
in old age.
The Decision to Save
Understanding why people save, and what they invest in, are questions of
central importance to economists and policymakers. With the growth of
DC saving plans in the United States and around the world, especially plans
having a 401(k) or employee contributory feature, it is clear that having
a meaningful retirement beneﬁt depends increasingly on participants’
decisions to save and invest in their retirement plans.
Neoclassical economic theory casts the saving outcome as the result of
people trading off current versus future consumption. Thus, households are
thought to compare the beneﬁt gained from consuming their income today,
with the beneﬁts of deferring some of that income into the future. This is
what is thought to drive contributions to a 401(k) or individual retirement
account, with the goal being to save for retirement. The life-cycle model of
saving posits that individuals are rational planners of their consumption and
saving needs over their lifetimes, taking into account the interests of their
heirs (Modigliani and Brumberg, 1954). During their younger years, workers
4 Olivia S. Mitchell and Stephen P. Utkus
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tend to be net dissavers, borrowing from the future by means of debt to boost
current consumption; middle-aged individuals become net savers and
purchasers of ﬁnancial assets and enter “accumulation” phase, during which
they stockpile assets for the ﬁnal, retired phase of life. As labor earnings
decline or disappear, people then decumulate or draw down their ﬁnancial
assets to ﬁnance old-age consumption. According to the tenets of life-cycle
theory, people will logically develop assets for retirement that will be sufﬁ-
cient to protect them from unexpected declines in their standard of living in
old age.
On balance, the life-cycle theory is thought to do a reasonable job of
explaining patterns of household saving behavior. Saving generally rises
with income and age, and it is positively associated with education and total
wealth. Young households generally have more debt than assets, while
prime-aged households do appear to begin saving more and accumulating
ﬁnancial holdings. Finally, in retirement, people do tend to consume por-
tions of their ﬁnancial assets as they age.3
On the other hand, some saving behavior appears to be at odds with the
theory. Consider, ﬁrst, a fundamental question: How good are households
at calculating an appropriate saving goal for retirement? Arguably, if the
life-cycle analysis is true, households should have some demonstrated skill
at estimating their needs for retirement, and analysis of actual savings
behavior should demonstrate some reasonably widespread competency at
the task. Yet, superﬁcially the retirement savings problem is perhaps an
ideal illustration of Simon’s “bounded rationality.” Being good at retire-
ment savings requires accurate estimates of uncertain future proces-
ses, including lifetime earnings, asset returns, tax rates, family and health
status, and longevity. In order to solve this problem, the human brain as
a calculating machine would need to have the capacity to solve many
decades-long time value of money problems, with massive uncertainties as
to stochastic cash ﬂows and their timing.
In fact, survey and empirical research suggests that individuals are not
particularly good at the retirement savings problem. Relatively few people
feel they are able to plan effectively for retirement (Lusardi, Chapter 9, this
volume). Indeed, surveys repeatedly ﬁnd that fewer than 40 percent of US
workers have calculated how much they will need to retire on, 30 percent
have not saved anything for retirement, and only 20 percent feel very con-
ﬁdent about having enough money to live comfortably in retirement
(EBRI, 2003).
Furthermore, the empirical evidence suggests that failing to save enough
also has serious negative consequences. A recent study of post-retirement
consumption patterns indicates that US workers experience an unexpected
decline in their standard of living after retirement (Bernheim, Skinner, and
Weinberg, 2001). This consumption drop is even more precipitous in
the United Kingdom (Banks, Blundell, and Tanner, 1998).4 Other research
1 / Lessons from Behavioral Finance 5
Utkas-01.qxd 27/5/04 2:55 PM Page 5
suggests that only 30 percent of pre-retirees are fully prepared for retirement
at age 65 in the United States (Moore and Mitchell, 2000). Of the remain-
ing group, another 30 percent is likely to close the savings gap by age 65,
though this hardly appears to be evidence of a long-term, lifelong rational
planner at the heart of the life-cycle model. Finally, fully 40 percent appear
unlikely to achieve a reasonable standard of replacement income by age 65.
The numbers are much more pessimistic if retirement is planned for age 62,
when the median American typically retires.
Behavioral economists would not ﬁnd it surprising that people struggle
with retirement saving in view of the problem’s complexity. Indeed, many
would take it as prima facie evidence that large groups of workers do not
“get the saving problem right,” contrary to the assumption of rationality
and wise planning underlying the life-cycle model.
The Problem of Self-Control
What might explain this lack of retirement preparation? Behavioralists
tend to rely on a straightforward psychological explanation called “lack of
willpower.” This explanation is often described as “bounded self-control”:
That is, people try to save for retirement, but they too often prove to be
limited in their capacity or desire to execute intentions (Thaler and
Shefrin, 1981). In a sense, saving for retirement requires behavior similar
to those undertaken in other behavior modiﬁcation programs such as
exercising, dieting, quitting smoking, or following through on New Year’s
resolutions. It would seem that while people intellectually “understand” the
beneﬁts of a speciﬁc behavior, and they may even have some idea of how to
get started, they have difﬁculty implementing their intentions. Too often,
they struggle to take action, and when they do act, their behaviors are often
half-hearted or ineffective.
What evidence is there that problems of self-control may be important
deterrents to saving for retirement? One body of researchers offers practi-
cal and theoretical insights into how individuals make tradeoffs regarding
risk and time. Psychologists have shown that peoples’ near-term discount
rates are much higher than their long-term discount rates (Laibson,
Repetto, and Tobacman, 1998). In Thaler’s (1981) formulation, people
confronting long-term decisions can exhibit high levels of patience. For
instance, they might say “If I can receive an apple in 100 days and two
apples in 101 days, I’ll be happy to wait the extra day for another apple.”
But when the decision shifts to the present, their patience wears thin and
they think: “I’d rather have an apple today than wait for two tomorrow.”5
In standard time value of money calculations, discount rates are postu-
lated to remain constant over time, so they do not vary today, tomorrow, or
a year from now. Given this assumption, one dollar saved today would be
perceived to be worth exponentially more (e.g. $5.74) in 30 years’ time
6 Olivia S. Mitchell and Stephen P. Utkus
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(Figure 1-1). But when individuals are “hyperbolic discounters,” they apply
high discount rates to the near term and lower discount rates to the future.
In this case, one dollar’s worth of saving today is perceived as growing more
rapidly in the short run, and less in the longer run. Hence the incremental
gains from extending one’s time horizon are perceived to be relatively mod-
est, compared to those of the conventional “exponential discounter.” As
illustrated by the increasing slope of the exponential line, exponential
savers foresee ever-increasing rewards to deferring consumption by another
year. For hyperbolic discounters, rewards are left to accelerate quickly, and
then taper off. Put simply, workers who are hyperbolic discounters place a
lower value on future beneﬁts and overvalue the present. The application to
retirement is clear: They will overconsume today and undersave, as a result
of self-control problems when it comes to saving for retirement.
Decision theorists working in this vein seek to understand the self-control
problem in a deeper way, delving into the structure and processing mech-
anisms of the human brain. For instance, Weber (this volume) notes that
the brain consists of an older, limbic system shared with lower-order ani-
mals, which is the source of emotional or affective decisionmaking; and a
more “modern” cerebral layer, which is a late-stage evolutionary trait in
humans and the source of conceptual or symbolic processing. Perhaps
because of this, processing of emotions typically involves gauging risk in
terms of two components: “Dread risk,” or the potential for catastrophe,
and “uncertainty risk,” involving a generalized fear of the unknown or the
new. Weber suggests that retirement risks rate low along both dimensions:
Few people have a palpable fear of impending disaster or of great uncer-
tainty in their retirement planning, as compared to other risks in their lives.
1 / Lessons from Behavioral Finance 7
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In Weber’s framework, the self-control problem of retirement saving must
join both cerebral and emotional decisionmaking simultaneously, if people
are to be prompted to take effective action. For example, if one were to
experience the risks of retirement in the present so as to stimulate the
brain’s affective system, people might attempt a real-world experiment such
as attempting to live on, say, two-thirds of their income for the next month.
Whether viewed from an economics or a decision theoretic perspective,
the self-control problem supports the view of a wide divergence between
individuals’ desires and their actual behaviors (Saliterman and Sheckley,
this volume). A survey of 10,000 employees at a single ﬁrm found that
68 percent of participants said their retirement savings rate was “too low”
(Choi et al., 2001a). When queried, they reported that they should be saving
14 percent of average earnings, whereas in fact, they were only saving about
6 percent. (The remaining one-third of the participants believed their sav-
ing patterns were just about right and fewer than 1 percent felt they were
saving too much.) Similarly, in Clark et al. (this volume), retirement plan
participants reported that they knew they were saving less than they should.
In other words, a key obstacle to saving more is not necessarily lack of
awareness, but rather the ability to take action on the knowledge. The difﬁ-
cult task is to overcome hyperbolic discounting, to merge conceptual and
affective reasoning into a course of effective action.
In recognition of such problems, people often seek to protect themselves
through the use of commitment devices, or mechanisms that help foster
desirable changes in behavior (cf. Laibson, 1997; and Laibson, Repetto, and
Tobacman, 1998). Commitment devices for saving may be an analogue of
the fad diet: One way of imposing some degree of discipline on one’s way-
ward behavior is to create some seemingly arbitrary rules about what one
can and cannot eat. “Pay yourself ﬁrst” is a standard commitment device
used by ﬁnancial planners seeking to encourage disciplined saving and
budgeting; it is also the principle underlying US payroll-deduction 401(k)
plans. These plans are one of the most successful commitment devices
in current use, and they are formulated such that contributions are auto-
matically deducted from workers’ pay before the money can be spent.
Participation rates in 401(k)-type plans, where payroll deduction is the
norm, are at least four times as high as for Individual Retirement Accounts
(IRA), where structured payroll deductions are uncommon; according to
1997 tax return data, some 27 percent of workers contributed to workplace
savings plans, compared with 6 percent contributing to an IRA (CBO,
2003). Other commitment devices include tax refunds and Holiday Clubs,
where individuals engage in seemingly irrational economic activity (e.g.
loaning money to the government or to their local banks at below-market
rates) in exchange for discipline at accumulating savings. Withdrawal
restrictions on IRAs and 401(k)s and other retirement plans also appear
to be commitment devices: Once the money is allocated to these plans, 
8 Olivia S. Mitchell and Stephen P. Utkus
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a psychological and ﬁnancial hurdle is imposed on accessing the money,
helping to counteract lapses in personal willpower.
Other evidence that individuals vary in their capacity for self-control and
ﬁnancial discipline comes from industry surveys of workers’ savings and
planning behavior. Ameriks, Caplin, and Leahy (2003) as well as Lusardi
(Chapter 9, this volume) ﬁnd that workers’ “propensity to plan” has strong
positive inﬂuence on retirement wealth accumulation. MacFarland et al.
(Chapter 6, this volume) indicate that as many as half of pension particip-
ants are dis- or uninterested in the ﬁnancial and retirement planning
activities thought necessary to plan successful retirement. In fact, a “plan-
ner” paradigm, where the individual consciously pursues retirement saving
and investment goals in a disciplined, systematic way, appears to apply to
only about half of the retirement plan population. The other half appears
singularly unable to impose the self-control needed to solve this problem.
Framing and Default Choices
Many individuals deviate from standard economic theory in another
important way: They can be easily inﬂuenced by decision framing. Rational
economic agents would not be expected to vary their responses to a ques-
tion based on how it is asked. But in practice, many people do exactly that,
both in the savings area and, as we show later, in investment decisionmaking
as well. A by-now classic example of decision framing arises with automatic
enrollment in retirement saving plans. Under the traditional (non-
automatic) approach, the employee would have to make a “positive election”
to join the 401(k) plan. By contrast, with automatic enrollment, the
employee would be signed up by the employer for the plan at a given
percentage contribution rate, and the employee retains the right to opt out
of this decision.
This simple rephrasing of the saving question elicits a dramatically dif-
ferent response in plan participation rates. Madrian and Shea (2001) have
powerfully shown that when workers are required to opt in, the default
decision (or the non-decision) is to save nothing; by dramatic contrast, with
automatic enrollment, the default decision proves to be that people save at
the rate speciﬁed by the employer. For one large US ﬁrm, plan participa-
tion rates jumped from 37 percent to 86 percent for new hires after auto-
matic enrollment was introduced (Figure 1-2). What this suggests, in the
end, is that many workers do not have particularly ﬁrm convictions about
their desired savings behavior. Merely by rephrasing the question, their
preferences can be changed—from not saving to saving.
The impact of automatic enrollment is not just an illustration of framing
questions, but also part of a broader behavioral phenomenon, namely the
power of the “default option” and its inﬂuence on decisionmaking. When con-
fronted with difﬁcult decisions, individuals tend to adopt heuristics (shortcuts)
1 / Lessons from Behavioral Finance 9
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that simplify the complex problems they face. One simple heuristic is to accept
the available default option—that is, rather than making an active choice,
accept the choice made by others. And, as noted in 401(k) enrollment, the
simplest default is the non-decision: Do nothing.
An emerging literature indicates that individual behavior is easily swayed
by default choices.6 Again, automatic enrollment provides another illustra-
tion of the unexpected effects of default behavior. It turns out that while
automatic enrollment boosts the number of individuals saving in a retire-
ment plan, it might not actually increase total plan savings (Choi et al.,
2001b). The reason is that, when automatically enrolled, people who would
have voluntarily enrolled in the plan at higher contribution rates or chosen
more aggressive investments decide to stick with the low saving rate and
conservative investment option set by their employer. Thus, the positive
effect is that saving rises for people who formerly did not participate, but
an unexpectedly negative result is that saving falls for those who would
have enrolled at higher rates and in more aggressive options, but instead
elected to adopt the employer’s defaults. On net, it appears that these two
effects can largely offset one another.
More broadly, Choi et al. (2003) develop a model of a procrastination
and default-driven saver and the choice of optimal savings rates. That study
argues that optimal defaults for such savers are, in effect, the corner points
or defaults of the plan savings problem—a saving rate of 0 percent, a saving
rate equal to the employer matching contribution, and a saving rate at the
maximum allowed by the plan. Both their theoretical models and the prac-
tical evidence on automatic enrollment underscore how profound the
impact can be of the selection of a default option.
10 Olivia S. Mitchell and Stephen P. Utkus
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Inertia and Procrastination
Evidence on automatic enrollment has also revealed another anomaly
about individuals and their saving behavior: The important impact that
inertia or procrastination plays on decisionmaking. In Madrian and Shea’s
(2001) analysis of automatic enrollment, they showed that the beneﬁt of
higher plan participation rates appeared to be offset by a profound level of
inertia. Most participants remained at the default savings and conservative
investment choices set for them by their employer. Once enrolled, particip-
ants made few active changes to the contribution rates or investment mixes
selected for them by their employer; rather, they simply stayed with what
was assigned to them.
Another analysis (Choi et al., 2001a), explored how inertia and default
behavior inﬂuenced several other deﬁned contribution plan activities:
Enrollment, cash distributions at termination, the match level, eligibility,
and the impact of education, among others. The authors concluded that,
more often than not, many participants followed “the path of least resist-
ance” in their decisionmaking—in effect, making the easiest, rather than
the best, decision. Again, the persistence of inertia and what might be
called a passive approach to decisionmaking are both indicative of indi-
viduals being somewhat imperfect rational economic agents in their retire-
ment and savings decisions.
An illustration of this “desire versus action” compares workers’ attitudes
expressed after having attended an employee education seminar, with
actual behavioral changes recorded on company administrative data sys-
tems (Choi et al., 2001a). Immediately following a seminar, for example, all
workers not participating in a ﬁrm’s 401(k) plan indicated in a survey that
they would join the plan. In fact, however, over the next 6 months, only
14 percent did so. A similar, though smaller, gap between desire and action
was true for other behaviors, including intentions to boost saving, change
existing portfolio allocations, or change the mix of future contributions
(see Table 1-1).
1 / Lessons from Behavioral Finance 11
TABLE 1-1 The Self-Control Problem: Divergence between Desired and 
Actual Behavior
Action Planned Change (%) Actual Change (%)
Enroll in 401(k) plan 100 14
Increase contribution rate 28 8
Change fund selection 47 15
Change fund allocation 36 10
Source : Choi et al. (2001a : table 6).
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Other Inﬂuences
These behavioral ﬁndings are further supported by new research on the
impact of investment choices and peer groups on saving rates. One tenet of
contemporary economics is that more choice is better. Yet, as Sethi-Iyengar,
Huberman, and Jiang (Chapter 5, this volume) show, offering workers
many investment choices can produce “choice overload.” In this case, plan
participants become overwhelmed with the complexity of the decision, and
as a result, pension plan participation is reduced. Faced with complex
investment choices, some participants may elect to simplify the decision by
following the “default” heuristic (i.e. “Don’t decide, don’t join the plan.”)
Similarly, Duﬂo and Saez (this volume) ﬁnd that saving decisions can
be strongly inﬂuenced by peers. For instance, in several striking experi-
ments and case studies, they conclude that people with virtually identical
demographic characteristics can have dramatically different saving rates,
depending on whether their peers save for retirement. They also demon-
strate that communications directed to an individual can inﬂuence not
only the individual’s savings behavior, but also the behavior of others in his
or her work group.
Automatic Saving Plans: Save More Tomorrow
Such behavioral insights into saving behavior have been illustrated in an
interesting way in the Save More Tomorrow (or SMT) program developed
by Benartzi and Thaler (forthcoming). Under this program, plan
participants indicate that they wish to increase their pension saving rates
on a regularly scheduled basis, at prespeciﬁed future dates (e.g. on their
anniversary date with the company). This mechanism is designed to
address several behavioral anomalies. First, it recognizes that individuals
have self-control problems and beneﬁt from a precommitment device
when it comes to retirement saving. Second, it exploits inertia, since people
tend to sign up initially and the program is automatically carried out in the
future. Third, it recognizes the possibility of hyperbolic discounting: That
is, people tend to be averse to saving today but they are willing to push off
their commitment to the future—to promise to “save more tomorrow.” As
hyperbolic discounters, they signiﬁcantly underestimate the impact of such
future commitment. Last, the program exploits money illusion. Thus, par-
ticipants often think only in terms of nominal take-home pay, so if the sav-
ings increase is designed to coincide with pay raises, they tend to believe
that the savings increase had little or no cost, even though their real cur-
rent consumption may have declined by a small amount.
In the initial study, the SMT program was offered to employees at a 
300-person ﬁrm. Employees were given the option of ﬁnancial counseling;
most signed up for the counseling, and received the advice that they should
boost their savings rates by an average of 5 percent. Nearly 80 workers took that
12 Olivia S. Mitchell and Stephen P. Utkus
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advice; many more, just over 160, signed up for the SMarT plan instead, which
required annual increases of 3 percent. After 3 years, the individuals who
signed up for SMT experienced a dramatic increase in their savings rates—
from 3.5 percent before the plan began, to 11.6 percent (Figure 1-3).
The popularity of the SMT program provides further evidence of the
divergence between real-world employees and the rational agents assumed
by many economic theorists working on theoretical saving models. Many
people attempt to save for retirement and even appear to know when they
are not doing well as they should, but they struggle with exercising the
right degree of self-control or willpower. Through inertia and procrastina-
tion, default decisions are easiest to maintain, including saving nothing at
all, or at one’s current rate, particularly if changing behavior requires
incurring the costs of saving at a higher level. Reframing the saving deci-
sion to include defaults with automatically higher saving rates, and using
commitment devices, inertia, and money illusion to address the self-control
problems of hyperbolic discounters, all seem useful approaches to address
the practical problems associated with the saving decision.
The Investment Decision
As in the case of the saving problem, the question of how to invest
one’s money during the accumulation phase has been widely explored in a
well-developed model of investment decisionmaking commonly denomin-
ated modern portfolio theory (MPT). The principles of MPT are at the heart
of investment decisionmaking, both in employer-directed deﬁned beneﬁt (DB)
plans, and employee-directed DC plans. MPT inﬂuences everything
from strategic asset allocation decisions in deﬁned beneﬁt DB plans, and
1 / Lessons from Behavioral Finance 13
3.5
% 6.5
9.4
11.6
13.6
Initial 1st 2nd
Increase
3rd 4th
0
4
8
12
16
Figure 1-3. The impact of commitment devices and inertia: The impact of SMT on
plan saving rates.
Source : Benartzi and Thaler (2004).
Utkas-01.qxd 27/5/04 2:55 PM Page 13
investment advice and education programs in deﬁned contribution DC
plans, to more technical issues such as performance attribution for invest-
ment managers.
In broad-brush terms, MPT seeks to characterize capital market assets,
whether stocks or ﬁxed income investments, in terms of their expected mean
return and their volatility or variance—hence, the term “mean-variance”
investing. Rational investors seek out efﬁcient combinations of securities that
optimize risk and return, and a given portfolio is on the “efﬁcient frontier” if
it offers the highest return for a given level of risk. Individuals and institu-
tions select from the array of portfolio choices on the efﬁcient frontier based
on their expected utility. In their utility preferences, individuals are pre-
sumed to be risk-averse, meaning that they penalize, or demand higher com-
pensation for, riskier investments. Also, as risk increases, the compensation
they require increases at a faster rate.
One of the important predictions of MPT is that investors will be inade-
quately compensated for assuming the risks of investing in an individual
security. In other words, an efﬁcient capital market will compensate investors
only for the aggregate market risk they endure, so there will be no single-
stock investments on the efﬁcient frontier. Consequently, rational investors
will seek to maximize portfolio diversiﬁcation and eliminate all stock-speciﬁc
risk, in the pursuit of optimal portfolio solutions. This principle has been at
the foundation of the growth of low-cost index strategies as an investment
management style in both DB and DC retirement plans.
Another implication of MPT is the theory of time diversiﬁcation—the
closer one is to an anticipated investment goal where spending from the
portfolio begins (such as retirement), the less risky will be the investment
portfolio. In practice, ﬁnancial counselors frequently propose time diversi-
ﬁcation as a popular investment principle, suggesting, in one popular for-
mulation, that people invest 100 percent minus their age in stocks. The
time diversiﬁcation view is also the basis for most DC education and advis-
ory services, which suggest that older investors should hold more conservat-
ive portfolios than younger investors. Yet, this theory has important critics
including Paul Samuelson (1989) and Bodie (1995), who suggest that
investors ought to hold ﬁxed asset allocation percentages over their entire
lifetimes. Finally, richer versions of MPT extend the analysis beyond trade-
able securities, to encompass the people’s broader wealth portfolio. For
example, Campbell and Viceira (2002) and Davis and Willen (2002) sug-
gest that risk and return tradeoffs should encompass illiquid holdings like
housing and human capital.
As with saving theory, behavioral economics asks a very fundamental
question about investors in general, and plan participants in particular:
How good are they at actually understanding and acting on the predic-
tions of mean–variance theory? Arguably, a rational investor should do a
reasonable job of constructing mean–variance efﬁcient portfolios, so there
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should be some evidence of widespread competency at these types of
investment decisions. Worrisome for the MPT theorists are some key facts
about investor behavior. Of US households who own stocks, the median
family owns only two positions, and even the most afﬂuent households
hold a median of 15 (Polkovnichenko, 2003). These low levels of diversiﬁ-
cation fall well short of the number of positions thought to represent a well-
diversiﬁed portfolio. It appears that for many investors, diversiﬁcation is
more akin to holding a variety of assets rather than the construction of a
well-diversiﬁed portfolio in an MPT sense.7 A related diversiﬁcation puzzle
is why, in DC retirement plans, do so many participants overinvest in their
employer’s stock? A recent study by Mitchell and Utkus (2003) estimated
that more than 11 million participants held over 20 percent of their 401(k)
account in their employer’s stock; of that group, 5 million participants
had 60 percent or more in company stock. Finally, broad stock market
ﬂuctuations—like the technology bubble of the late 1990s and the subse-
quent bear market—seem hard to reconcile with a model of the investor as
a rational, mean–variance optimizing agent. So do levels of individual and
institutional trading in the stock market.
In this section, we ﬁrst summarize the accumulated evidence on mean–
variance behavior among investors—or rather, the case against mean–variance
behavior among investors. Much of this research, importantly, has been
drawn from participants in DC retirement plans in the United States. We
then turn to the attempts to develop alternative theories explaining
investor behavior.
Lack of Firm Preferences
The ﬁndings cited earlier on automatic enrollment illustrate that many
workers lack ﬁrm preferences for saving. Merely by rephrasing the question
from a positive to a negative election, workers who were not planning to
save suddenly ﬁnd themselves saving—and workers who would have saved
at higher savings rates ﬁnd themselves saving at the default set by their
employer. A similar lack of strong preferences appears to affect investment
decisions. Arguably, if investors were rational in a mean–variance sense,
one would ﬁrst expect them to have well-deﬁned preferences over their
portfolios. That is, they should have the courage of their convictions. After
all, the portfolio they select represents their unique expectations of risk
and return, and it is tailored to their own utility preferences.
In fact, retirement plan participants appear to have relatively weak pref-
erences for the portfolio they, in fact, elect (Benartzi and Thaler, 2002).
This was found in experiments where workers were given a choice between
holding their own portfolio, the portfolio of a median participant in their
plan, and the portfolio of the average participant: About eight out of ten
participants preferred the median to their own. Only 21 percent continued
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to prefer the portfolio they initially selected. Furthermore, many found the
average portfolio to be quite satisfactory. In other words, pension parti-
cipants seemed to be quite happy (or perhaps even happier!) with portfolios
constructed at the statistical average of their co-workers’ behavior, than
with the portfolios they themselves constructed.
This ﬁnding is supported by psychological literature regarding prefer-
ence reversals. That is, individuals often do not arrive at a decision with
ﬁrm preferences in mind; preferences appear not be hard-wired. Rather,
individual preferences tend to be situational and emerge at the time a deci-
sion is made, based on the conditions and information surrounding that
decision. To the extent this is true, preference reversals tend to be more
common than might be expected. Individuals who thought not to save ﬁnd
themselves saving; individuals who selected their own portfolio ﬁnd them-
selves just as happy, if not happier, with another choice.
Framing Effects
Just as saving choices can be affected by framing, so too can investment
decisions be inﬂuenced, sometimes strongly, by framing effects. Much of
the research in this area has investigated the impact of investment menu
design on participant investment choices in DC retirement plans. The
theme underlying this research is that menu design is a more powerful
inﬂuence on participant decisionmaking than the underlying risk and
return characteristics of the investments being offered. In this sense, the
investment menu in a retirement plan is an “opaque” frame, which most
participants cannot see through, to understand the underlying risk and
return characteristics of their investments. Put another way, many particip-
ants appear to have weak convictions regarding risk and return, and they
can easily be swayed in their decisions by the framing effects of an invest-
ment menu.
In one experiment, participants were asked to select an investment mix
for their retirement plans given two fund offerings (Benartzi and Thaler,
2001). Some participants were presented with a stock fund and a bond
fund; others with a stock fund and a balanced fund; and a third group with
a bond fund and a balanced fund. In all three cases, a common strategy was
to choose a 50/50 mix of the two funds offered, although many parti-
cipants did select different weightings. What was striking in the data was the
fact that radically different underlying asset allocations ensued, given the
different choices offered. For people given the choice of an equity fund
and a bond fund, the average allocation to equities was 54 percent. For
those offered two equity-oriented portfolios, a balanced fund and an equity
fund, the average allocation to equities was 73 percent. And for those
offered a balanced and a bond fund, the average allocation to equities was
only 35 percent. In a related experiment using investment menus with ﬁve
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funds, the authors found that the asset allocations chosen by participants
were again strongly inﬂuenced by menu design. If the plan offered several
equity funds, participants invested more in equities; when it included more
ﬁxed income funds, they chose ﬁxed income options instead.
A different study also asked plan participants to select investments from
three different menus, which the authors posed might be similar to the
structure of a privatized Social Security account (Benartzi and Thaler,
2001). The investments allowed ranged from A (low risk) to D (high risk).
The ﬁrst menu offered included options A, B, and C; the second menu, just
options B and C; and the third menu, options B, C, and D. Comparing
options B and C, which were in all three menus, 29 percent of the particip-
ants preferred C over B in the ﬁrst menu; 39 percent in the second menu;
and 54 percent in the third menu. In other words, in the ﬁrst menu, where
option C was at the extreme, it was liked least; in the third menu, where
option C was the middle choice, it was liked most. As with the asset alloca-
tion experiment above, this shows that participants appeared to use a naïve
heuristic (i.e. “avoid extremes, pick the middle option”) rather than main-
tain a consistent set of well-ordered risk preferences to select from the
investments offered.
Related research indicates that, beyond these menu effects, even simple
changes in the way information is presented can inﬂuence asset allocation
decisions (Benartzi and Thaler, 2001). In one experiment, plan particip-
ants were asked to make investment decisions based on reviewing the one-
year return proﬁle of US common stocks; in a second experiment, they
made decisions based on a 30-year return proﬁle. In the ﬁrst instance, the
average allocation to equities was 63 percent; in the second, 81 percent.
The implication is that plan sponsors can alter asset allocations if return
data are presented over different holding periods. And as Scott and Stein
show (this volume), different types of investment education and informa-
tion can substantially change retiree investment allocations.
Like the saving research discussed earlier, these ﬁndings underscore the
powerful inﬂuence of framing effects on decisionmaking in retirement
plans. Apparently, many plan participants seem to lack well-formed invest-
ment preferences, and these preferences appear to be easily altered by the
way the choices are presented to them.
Inertia and Procrastination
As with savings behavior, inertia also plays a large role in investment
decisionmaking, in addition to these framing effects. Madrian and Shea
(2001) and Choi et al. (2001b) reported high levels of inertia in investment
decisionmaking in their studies of participants and automatic enrollment.
To further underscore this point, we examined how 2.3 million plan parti-
cipants at the Vanguard Group allocated their new contributions accounts
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as of June 30, 2003 (Figure 1-4). First, we found that fewer than 10 percent
of plan participants change their contribution allocations each year.
Further, participants who initially enrolled in their plans near the top of
the bull market in 1999, allocated about 70 percent of new contributions to
equities in June of 2003, notwithstanding the huge market drop sustained
over the preceding 3-year period. Meanwhile, participants who newly
enrolled during the ﬁrst 6 months of 2003, after the 3-year fall in US equity
prices, allocated only 48 percent of new monies to equities. While this illus-
trates how sensitive participant investment decisions at enrollment are to
then-current market conditions, it also demonstrates the power of inertia.
It seems unlikely that participants enrolled in 1999 would have dramat-
ically different risk preferences than those who enrolled in 2003, yet the
recent enrollees were presumably making active choices based on then-
current information, whereas earlier enrollees did not react so dramati-
cally to market news.
Figure 1-4 also illustrates “anchoring” effects for pension investors.
Anchoring refers to the notion that decisionmaking is strongly inﬂuenced
by starting values, no matter how arbitrary they may be. Among particip-
ants, it appears that the relevant anchor is their initial allocation decision,
and subsequent portfolio changes tend to be made with reference to that
initial value, rather than on some absolute basis. For instance, participants
who enrolled at the peak of the bull market continued to allocate seven out
of ten dollars to equities by 2003, over 20 points higher than those
enrolling in the ﬁrst 6 months of 2003.
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Figure 1-4. Anchoring and adjustment: Current equity contributions by plan entry
date % contribution allocated to equity investments.
Source : Vanguard Group (2003).
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The Conundrum of Employer Stock
The use of company stock within US DC plans offers a compelling case study
about the relevance of mean–variance models to investor decisionmaking. As
noted earlier, Mitchell and Utkus (2003) have calculated that 11 million plan
participants have allocations above 20 percent of their account balance in
company stock—and 5 million have allocations above 60 percent of their
account balance. A conventional economic explanation for this phenom-
enon is that employers and stockholders seek to promote employee product-
ivity through stock ownership, and so they encourage or mandate large
employee holdings of company stock. As rational agents, however, employees
who are aware of the risks they are being required to assume, should demand
compensation in some other form, such as higher wages or beneﬁts.
There is some support for the “rational agent” view of workers holding
company stock. This is because concentrated company stock positions are
most common for large ﬁrms, and such ﬁrms typically pay higher wages
and beneﬁts to their employees. Yet, from a behavioral perspective, there is
also evidence that concentration stock positions are not solely due to
incentive effects; rather, it seems that computational or behavioral errors
on the part of participants also help explain the phenomenon. For
instance, Mitchell and Utkus (2003) use survey data to uncover evidence of
“risk myopia” regarding employer stock, in that many participants rate
their employer’s stock as safer than a diversiﬁed equity fund.
Another Vanguard survey (Table 1-2) illustrates that even after the post-
Enron publicity surrounding company stock, two-thirds of participants rate
their employer stock as safer than, or as safe as, a diversiﬁed portfolio of
many stocks. Only one-third said it was more risky. What is striking about
these results is the comparison between participant risk perceptions and
the actual return and volatility of their employer’s stock. Looking at the
risk ratings ﬁrst, it is natural to conclude that at least two-thirds of particip-
ants are not mean–variance investors when it comes to company stock.
They rate stock as safer than or as safe as a diversiﬁed portfolio, despite its
actual higher volatility than a broad market index: A clear-cut “error”
under modern portfolio theory. Arguably one-third of participants did
assess the risk correctly, in that they rated their employer’s stock as riskier
and its volatility higher. But it seems implausible to conclude that all parti-
cipants who understand mean–variance analysis may only be found among
the set holding riskier employer stocks; it is more likely that participant do
not base their risk perceptions on volatility. Instead, participants’ risk rat-
ings are well correlated with the historic relative returns of their employer’s
stock.
The conclusion that plan participants overlook volatility and focus on
returns is supported in Benartzi’s (2001) study of pension investments in
employer stock. Speciﬁcally, he ﬁnds that participant allocations were
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based on extrapolations of the company’s historic stock performance.
Participants who overweighted their employer’s stock based on good past
performance then found that those stocks subsequently generated below-
average performance. Conversely, those participants who underweighted
their employer’s stock due to poor past performance subsequently saw the
stock becoming an above-average performer.
Participants’ allocations were also inﬂuenced by whether their employer
provided a match in company stock, a phenomenon that Benartzi dubbed the
“endorsement effect.” The conclusion is that, just as menu design inﬂuences
participant investment decisions, so too does the employer’s plan design deci-
sion. Offering a match in company stock encourages participants to hold
more in stock than workers whose employers do not match in stock. Other
researchers have also argued that past performance, rather than risk, drives
participants’ portfolio decisions (e.g. Purcell, 2002; Huberman and
Sengmueller, 2003; Poterba et al., 2003; Choi et al., Chapter 7, this volume).
Reliance on Past Performance
Why do investors irrationally rely on past performance and fail to take
expected returns as well as risk into account, as modern portfolio theory
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TABLE 1-2 Perceptions of Company Stock Risk and Return
Participant Report: % of Actual Average Actual Average
Level of Risk in Participants Standard Deviation Company
Company Stockb of Company Stock
Stock (%)a Return (%)a
Q. Would you say your employer’s stock is more risky, less risky or has about the
same level of risk as an investment in a diversiﬁed stock fund with many different
stocks? (n  415)
More risky 33 40b 8.8b
Same level of risk 42 36b 2.0b
Less risky 22 31b 2.2b
Don’t know 3 35 6.0
Total 100
S&P 500 18b 1.1b
a Returns and standard deviations of participants’ company stock returns for the 5-year
period ending September 30, 2003. Standard deviation calculated over 60 months and
annualized.
b “More risk,” “same level of risk” and “less risky” categories are all signiﬁcantly different
from one another at the 95% or 99% level. Standard deviations are all signiﬁcantly higher
than the S&P 500 at the 99% level. Returns for “more risky” (“less risky”) are signiﬁcantly
lower (higher) than the S&P 500 at the 99% level.
Source : Vanguard Group (2003).
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suggests they should? Two behavioral phenomena may offer some answers.
A ﬁrst issue is the pervasiveness of the “representativeness heuristic” in
decisionmaking, explored by Tversky and Kahneman (1974). They found
that people tend to see patterns in small series of randomly drawn num-
bers, and when making decisions, people attempt to impose some order or
structure on the information that they see. For example, mutual fund
investors might identify a fund manager with 3 years of top performance
and conclude that the manager has unusual skill—rather than view it as a
random process. Of course, viewed across the universe of thousands of
investment managers, a given manager’s 3-year track record is just as likely
an indication of chance as of skill. The representativeness bias may partly
arise due to a framing problem: That is, rather than frame the skill versus
luck decision in terms of the universe of all individuals making portfolio
decisions, a fund investor may frame it narrowly in terms of the 3-year track
record of a single investment manager. As a result, what may actually be a
random outcome may instead appear to be logical sequence.
A second issue is that many people appear to be subject to what has been
called an “availability heuristic”: When faced with difﬁcult decisions, they
tend to rely on readily available information. A simple reason that investors
may rely on past performance could be because that information is cheaply
available. As any plan participant knows, retirement plans and investment
companies generate prodigious amounts of past performance data which
they make available in statements, on websites, in enrollment materials,
and in newsletter updates. Past performance is also pervasive in the media,
but very few report systematically on expected returns. Of course, in the
United States and elsewhere, reports on past investment performance are
often accompanied by the legal disclaimer that “past performance is no
guarantee of future results.” Yet, one need only compare the size of that
disclaimer to the volume of past performance data to understand its limita-
tions in the face of the availability heuristic.
In sum, the representativeness and availability heuristics may help
explain why, for example, mutual fund investors invariably chase perform-
ance in their fund purchase decisions (Patel, Zeckhauser, and Hendricks,
1991). Patterns suggesting superior performance are constructed from
small samples drawn either from skill or luck. And the pervasiveness of past
performance data leads to an inevitable reliance on past performance,
despite the legal caveats.
Prospect Theory
If plan participants are not necessarily mean–variance investors, then how
do they actually make decisions under uncertainty about their pension
investments? This is a complex question, partly because behavioral
research in the last 20 years has focused on analyzing how people evaluate
1 / Lessons from Behavioral Finance 21
Utkas-01.qxd 27/5/04 2:55 PM Page 21
risky choices in general; only recently has interest turned to investment
decisions.
The seminal theory of risky decisions was offered by Kahneman and
Tversky (1979), who modeled individuals as though they made decisions to
maximize an S-shaped value function depicted in Figure 1-5. This function
differs from conventional utility maximization in two critical ways. First,
individuals are thought to consider not how a decision inﬂuences total
wealth (as in standard utility theory) but rather incremental gains and
losses. Second, individuals are modeled as treating gains and losses quite
differently. The gain function (to the right of the origin) is concave, while
the loss function (to the left of the origin) is convex, with a much steeper
slope. What this means is that individuals will experience losses more
acutely than gains for a given dollar of gain or loss. Their experimental evid-
ence suggested that the index of loss-aversion is about 2.5: In other words,
when evaluating risky gambles, the individual will report that losses are
2.5 times as painful as the equivalent dollar value of gains. For example, if
someone were presented with a 50 percent chance of losing $1,000 or a
50 percent chance of gaining an unknown amount, $X, the evidence suggests
that many people would not entertain this gamble until the value X is on the
order of $2,500 or so.
This approach has come to be known as prospect theory, and it has poten-
tially important implications for investment behavior. For instance,
investors will seek to lock in certain gains and avoid certain losses. This
implies that individuals tend to be risk-averse for a known gain, but they
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Figure 1-5. Prospect theory value function.
Source : Kahneman and Tversky (1979).
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can become risk-seeking in an effort to avoid a certain loss. In addition,
actual behavior will depend on the exact sequence of gains and losses and
how the individual has incorporated prior gains and losses into current
perceptions. For example, suppose an individual wins $100. If offered a
reasonable chance to win more money or lose the $100, many people
would decline the additional gamble, because of the risk of forfeiting the
$100 sure gain. But if offered a choice to win more money while preserving
a meaningful part of the $100 gain, many people take the risk. This is
known as the “house money” effect: While people are generally risk-averse
in the domain of gains, if they feel they are risking someone else’s money
(e.g. accumulated earnings from prior bets), they become more risk-seeking.
On the loss side of the equation, after losing $100, many people will
accept a gamble that entails losing signiﬁcantly more than $100 in an effort
to recoup the $100 loss. This represents both the element of risk-seeking in
the domain of losses, and the “breakeven” effect. Faced with the realization
of a certain loss, many people seek additional risk, in an effort to recoup
their investment, contrary to the conventional economic notion that “sunk
costs are sunk costs” (i.e. rational agents should ignore realized losses).
This approach offers an explanation for why investors have difﬁculty realiz-
ing losses on their investments (a strong desire to avoid loss realization and
break even). It also might help explain why they sometimes increase risk-
taking in risk equity markets (existing gains appear to be locked in and are
“house money” which can be gambled) and in falling markets (existing
losses appear temporary and extra risk-taking will help recoup those
losses).8
Prospect theory and behavioral economics have been deemed relevant
to investment decisionmaking in three ways (Kahneman, 2003). First, in
the area of gains, investors are often characterized by overconﬁdence and
excessive optimism: People tend to construct forecasts of the future that
are typically too rosy. Second, in the area of losses, investor risk-aversion
will lead to an unwillingness to realize investment losses, and a premature
realization of investment gains (called by Shefrin and Statman the “disposi-
tion effect”; 1985). And third, if decisions are less than optimal due to both
overconﬁdence and loss avoidance, the impact of these anomalies will be
exacerbated by narrow framing effects. We consider each of these elements
in turn.
Overconﬁdence
In the domain of gains, one of the important ﬁndings of psychology and
behavioral economics is that peoples’ future forecasts are often character-
ized by widespread overconﬁdence and excessive optimism. Overconﬁd-
ence is a widely documented trait in human decisionmaking: Thus, people
systematically overrate their skills on such parameters as driving skills and
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humor. In business, managers tend to be overconﬁdent about their abilities:
For example, managers tend to overpay for mergers and acquisitions
because of overoptimistic assessments. Other professionals in a range of
diverse ﬁelds—in psychology, medicine, investments, engineering, and so
on—have demonstrated overconﬁdence in their decisionmaking. In a study
on future life prospects, college students were asked to evaluate the chances
of certain positive and negative events occurring in their lives (e.g. having a
bright career versus experiencing professional failure; maintaining ongoing
good health versus contracting a mortal disease while young; having a happy
versus a difﬁcult domestic and emotional life). When asked to judge their
own prospects, the students downplayed negative life events and emphasized
positive outcomes. What was interesting was that, when asked the same ques-
tions of their college roommates, the students were more even-handed in
their responses. Similarly, in medical decisionmaking, patients with mortal
diseases were shown to be much more optimistic about their future prospects
than their professional caregivers. Overall, the accumulated psychological
evidence regarding overconﬁdence in decisionmaking has been described as
the “Lake Wobegone” effect, named after a ﬁctional US town described on a
popular radio program where “all of the children are above average.”9
Such overconﬁdence may partly be the result of an inability to under-
stand accurately the role of random chance in determining the future. As
noted above in our discussion on representativeness, people are notori-
ously poor statisticians, and they ﬁnd patterns and trends in data that could
just as easily be explained by random chance. Individuals appear to signiﬁc-
antly underestimate the impact of random chance on their lives, and in
hindsight overemphasize the degree of control they have over outcomes.
Lack of objectivity might help explain self-evaluations: Individuals gener-
ally perceive themselves as better than others—and have better views of
themselves than others do. Poor risk calculations certainly play a role in
overconﬁdence: Individuals who are “100 percent sure” of their responses
to certain questions are usually wrong 20 percent of the time. Perceived
sense of control also plays a role: the stronger one’s sense of control, the
more powerful one’s sense of conﬁdence. Asked about the risks of a dis-
abling car accident, people are much more optimistic when they are dri-
ving, than when they are passengers. There is also a gender element at
work: Men tend to be more overconﬁdent than women.10
Overconﬁdence probably has some economic, psychological, and even
evolutionary positive beneﬁts: For example, it may be the wellspring of risk-
taking and entrepreneurial activity, or it may allow fast recovery from life’s
disappointments. But in the domain of investing, it may also lead to behav-
iors that are less than optimal and certainly at odds with mean–variance the-
ory. For instance, overconﬁdence helps explain the high levels of trading
activity in equity markets. Barber and Odean (2000) report high rates of
turnover, on the order of 75 percent, among households owning brokerage
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accounts. They calculate that trading is typically hazardous to one’s wealth,
with active traders earning 11.4 percent over a 5-year period, while the mar-
ket returned 17.9 percent, and low-turnover accounts 18.5 percent. That
study also reports that men trade 45 percent more than women and the dif-
ference is even stronger for single men versus single women. Agnew,
Balduzzi, and Sundén (2003) suggest that these trading results may be less
relevant for retirement plans, since participants could mentally account for
brokerage and retirement investments differently.
Other research focuses on afﬂuent male equity investors, and it has con-
ﬁrmed that overconﬁdence and an emphasis on personal skill are both
important attribute of investors, at least in the sample of experienced
investors surveyed by De Bondt (1998). Most of these investors exhibited a
high level of conﬁdence about the stocks they had selected, while their out-
look for the broad market was not as positively biased. They relied on their
own skills at selecting companies and tended to downplay the importance
of modern portfolio concepts like diversiﬁcation. From their perspective, it
seemed that diversiﬁcation was less focused on non-correlated stock hold-
ings and more about simple variety. These investors also tended to be sur-
prised about the relationship between the overall market and their own
holdings: That is, they downplayed the impact of market forces on their
portfolios.11 These diversiﬁcation results seem consistent with Goetzmann
and Kumar’s ﬁndings (2001) that individual investors do own multiple
stocks, but these are not drawn from uncorrelated industries and sectors so
they are not typically diversiﬁed in the modern portfolio sense. Statman
(Chapter 4, this volume) shows how behavioral theories of risk-taking may
be used to formulate alternative theories for portfolio construction.
Loss-Aversion and the Disposition Effect
If overconﬁdence helps explain behavior on the “upside” side of the
prospect theory ledger, then the “downside” is dominated by aversion to loss
realization. This plays out in interesting ways. For instance, as noted above,
people are inclined to take a gamble if confronted with the choice of realiz-
ing an incurred but not-yet-realized loss, versus taking the gamble in which
they might break or lose more. Particularly if there is a reasonable prospect
of breaking even and avoiding a loss, many people take the gamble and risk
losing even more money. In the investment setting, this manifests itself in
what Shefrin and Statman (1985) call the “disposition effect.” People who
invest in stocks appear to rush to realize gains too quickly: They try to lock
in or make certain the gains that they have already realized. On the other
hand, they also appear to have trouble “cutting their losses”; that is, they
hold onto loss-making stocks too long in the hope of recovering their
investment. The impact of this effect on brokerage account investors is not
small: Odean (1998a) calculated that investors who sold winning stocks saw
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those stocks outperform the market by 2 percent in the subsequent year,
while investors who kept their losing stocks saw those stocks underperform
by market by 1 percent over the same period. In total, the net impact of sell-
ing winners too quickly while holding losers cost investors 3 percent per
year in terms of portfolio returns. These results also validated the notion of
overconﬁdence in investment decisions: People continued to hold and to
sell the wrong stocks, leading to lower returns, despite actual results.
Narrow Framing
Adding to what has already been discussed, there is evidence that overcon-
ﬁdence and loss-aversion are exacerbated by too narrow a framing of risky
decisions (Kahneman, 2003). Few investors would take a gamble involving
a 50 percent chance of winning $1,500, versus a 50 percent chance of losing
$1,000. (With loss-aversion parameters of around 2.5, most investors would
not take the gamble until the gain was closer to $2,500.) Yet, experimental
evidence indicates that people are more willing to accept this gamble when
they are given the opportunity to play it many times, or when it is framed in
terms of changes to their entire net worth. Perhaps, as Kahneman
observes, it is more natural for investors to “think small” when facing a one-
time gamble, but they may get it right and “think large” if facing sequences
of gambles or changes to total wealth.
The Decumulation Decision
The last phase of ﬁnancial decisionmaking for retirement happens during
the decumulation period. This is likely to occur during later middle age and
beyond, and it is the period when most people decide how they will spend
down their accumulated assets. Of course, if there were no uncertainty, the
rational life-cycler would plan to spend down retirement assets so as to
ensure optimal retirement consumption and protect bequest motives (if
any). People having saved for retirement via a formal pension scheme
would be expected to decumulate their assets just as their non-pensioned
counterparts having the same total assets, except insofar as it reduced the
retiree’s tax obligation (Brown et al., 1999).
In practice, of course, people confront many sources of risk during the
retirement period. The most important of these are longevity risk, inﬂation
risk, health risks (leading to unexpected expenses and costs), and capital
market risks. All or a combination of these risks can contribute to experi-
encing consumption shortfalls during retirement—or simply running out
of money. So many fundamental uncertainties, further complicated by the
psychological considerations discussed above, combine to make it quite dif-
ﬁcult for retirees to deftly manage the drawdown process for retirement
accounts in old age. In this section, accordingly, we ﬁrst summarize available
evidence on how people deal with longevity risk, then turn to a discussion of
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inﬂation risk, and ﬁnally conclude with a brief discussion of how to manage
capital market risk during the withdrawal period.
Longevity Risk
People do not know precisely how long they will live, hence they run the
risk of exhausting their assets before dying. Such risk exposure can be
reduced by consuming less per year during retirement, but of course this
simply elevates the chances that a retiree might die with “too much” wealth
left over.
One way to offset longevity risk is to buy an annuity with all or part of
one’s retirement assets (Brown et al., 2001; Mitchell and McCarthy, 2003;
Drinkwater and Sondergeld, Chapter 15, this volume). Single premium
lifelong annuities are relatively appealing, since they continue to pay bene-
ﬁts as long as the retiree lives, irrespective of whether the retiree outlives
the life tables. Indeed, recent survey analysis (Panis, Chapter 14, this vol-
ume) ﬁnds that retirees holding annuities are more satisﬁed with their
retirement, holding other things constant. Consequently, the implication is
that at least partial annuitization may provide peace of mind associated
with longevity protection.
Notwithstanding the substantial theoretical appeal of annuities, however,
relatively little retirement money is currently devoted to the purchase of
annuities in most developed countries. For instance, life annuity purchases
in the United States amounted to more than $120 billion in 1999, but the
majority of sales were for variable annuities which are used mainly in the
accumulation process rather than for decumulation products paying life-
time beneﬁts (Brown et al., 2001). In the group pensions market, there is
also growing attention to this issue. Previously, DB plans normally paid
either single or joint and survivor life annuities as a matter of course; rarely
was any sort of lump sum option available in lieu of the lifetime beneﬁt
stream. Of late, however, DB pensions have begun offering lump sum dis-
tributions to their retirees, akin to the payouts popularized in the DC world
(Moore and Muller, 2002). As a result, workers reaching retirement age
with pension coverage are increasingly unlikely to take their beneﬁts as life-
time annuities. Indeed, a recent study found that three quarters of com-
pany pension distributions are currently paid as lump sum cashouts rather
than as lifetime annuity payments (McGill et al., 2004). In this sense, fewer
and fewer retirement plans are providing longevity insurance in the form
of lifetime insured annuity beneﬁts.
Several explanations for the declining demand for annuitization in
retirement have been offered. One factor is that people may be poorly
informed regarding their remaining life expectancies, tending to under-
estimate the risk of outliving one’s income. For instance, a recent industry
survey reported that only one-third of the respondents knew that someone
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who attained the age of 65 had a substantial chance of living beyond his life
expectancy (Metlife, 2003). Yet other surveys report that older people’s
expected survival patterns track actuarial tables relatively closely (Hurd
and McGarry, 1995), and retirement asset shortfalls appear uncorrelated
with people expecting to die soon in retirement (Mitchell, Moore, and
Phillips, 2000). A different factor discouraging annuity purchase is that
retirees often have strong bequest motives, and many of them expect to
have to pay for long-term care. In such cases, they might elect to hold on
to their funds rather than annuitize them on retirement. And of course, to
the extent they have Social Security and DB pension plans, they will be less
likely to annuitize all their assets since they are partly protected against
longevity risk already (Brown et al., 2002).
Three other “rational” explanations may provide insights into why annu-
ity purchases are low despite the fact that baby boomers are moving into
retirement age. First is an interest rate factor. The decision to annuitize at
a given point in time represents an irreversible decision to “lock in” then-
current yields (which underlie the contract pricing). A second is the cost
factor: Retirees sometimes see insured products as uncompetitive with pure
investments due to the loads levied by the insurance providers. Yet, the
loads have decreased substantially over time, and evidence indicates
that retirees can expect high “money’s worth” for annuity products in
many countries (Mitchell, Moore, and Phillips, 2000). Consequently the
respectable returns combined with the insurance protection should induce
more interest in this payout structure as the baby boomer generation
moves into the retirement years. The other main reason lump sums are
attractive is that regulations currently permit workers to take a relatively
large lump sum computed with a transitorily depressed discount rate, and
in many cases this is more economically proﬁtable than leaving the funds in
the plan to grow.12
Behavioral factors may also explain the low demand for annuities in
retirement, including most importantly loss-aversion. This arises because
some retirees may worry about potential losses to heirs in the event that
they die “early,” since annuitization typically eliminates the possibility for
bequeathing these funds. Adding to the problem is that retirees may heavily
discount future beneﬁt coverage in the event that they live a long time in
retirement. Such an asymmetric valuation could enhance peoples’ proba-
bility of taking their pension accruals as a lump sum versus buying a life
annuity, and may explain why some argue that “locking up” one’s assets in
annuities boosts rather than reduces risk. To meet such concerns, some
insurers have begun to combine annuity offerings with life insurance, long-
term care, and disability beneﬁts, so as to reduce the fear of “losing it all”
due to premature death. Employers wishing to help workers with their self-
control problem might offer annuities as the default option at retirement,
rather than making the lump sum the standard choice.
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Nonetheless, it does appear that many people fundamentally undervalue
the appeal of a lifetime annuity—sometimes at substantial, if not over-
whelming, cost. One fascinating example is a study of annuitization behav-
ior for personnel at the US Department of Defense (DOD) (Warner and
Pleeter, 2001). In 1992, about 65,000 ofﬁcers and enlisted personnel were
involved in a program to reduce stafﬁng at the DOD. To this end, they were
offered payments from their retirement plan in the form of an annuity or a
lump sum. The internal rate of return on the annuity ranged from
17.5 percent to 19.8 percent, at a time when government bond rates were
around 7 percent. Economists estimated that all of the ofﬁcers and half of
the enlisted personnel would take the annuity. In the end, contrary to
expectations, 52 percent of the ofﬁcers and 92 percent of the enlisted per-
sonnel took the lump sum. In total, the DOD employees forfeited a total of
$1.7 billion in economic value, by electing the lump sum over the annuity.
Inﬂation and Capital Market Risk
Last, but certainly not least, we turn to the risk of inﬂation and capital mar-
ket risk during the retirement period. It is somewhat well known that the
common worker is rather poorly informed about volatility in asset returns
and inﬂation rates (Bodie et al., 2002), a problem that also besets him dur-
ing the retirement period as well. For instance, from the late 1970s to the
late 1990s, the United States had a relatively low rate of inﬂation and rising
stock prices that contributed to a widespread belief that equities serve as a
good hedge for inﬂation. Yet, this is not accurate: During the 1970s, inﬂa-
tion moved into double digits, yet stock prices fell by over half in a short
2-year jolt (1974–75). Brown, Mitchell, and Poterba (2000) also conﬁrm
that stocks have been a poor inﬂation hedge in the United States, at least in
the short to medium term. For this reason, retirees seeking protection
against the destructive impact of inﬂation over a long retirement period
would beneﬁt substantially from holding at least a part of their ﬁnancial
assets in inﬂation-protected assets such as Treasury Inﬂation-protected
Securities (TIPS).
The fact that workers take lump sums from their pensions, rather than
have their funds continue to be managed by the pension fund itself, may
also be of concern for several other reasons. One potential explanation is
overconﬁdence: Many people believe they can live well on relatively small
asset pools during retirement, yet after leaving work, they then ﬁnd they
run out of money, sometimes within a few months of retirement. This is
exacerbated by the fact that the lump sum beneﬁt is often “framed” in a
way that induces them to overvalue the lump sum and undervalue the
annuity. Offering a retiree a lump sum of $100,000, versus taking a joint
and survivor annuity of $600 per month for life, tends to highlight the
“massive sum” versus the longevity protection.
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Another concern is that, due to lack of self-control, people may be
tempted to spend their lump sums once they are out of the pension plan.
While recipients do roll over some of their lump sum distributions into
Individual Retirement Accounts, they do use a large fraction to pay debts
and cover current expenses (Moore and Muller, 2002). A problem with tak-
ing a lump sum from the pension, of course, is that the amount withdrawn
becomes subject to regular income tax and it may also elicit excise tax if the
recipient is younger than age 591⁄2. Finally, many retirees are poorly
equipped to manage their investments in old age, perhaps because they
never were particularly ﬁnancially literate, or perhaps they suffer dimin-
ished faculties due to poor health and lack of mobility with age. And it is
difﬁcult even for experts to undertake the sophisticated calculations
required to simultaneously manage the investment portfolio, the draw-
down rule, and the target horizon over which these decisions are made
(Dus, Maurer, and Mitchell, 2004). Most ﬁnancial planners are not particu-
larly well versed in these techniques either, nor are their clients. But pos-
sibly due to overconﬁdence, they often expect the money to last longer and
earn more than a prudent strategy would dictate.
Policy and Plan Design Alternatives
Our overview thus far has illustrated how behavioral economics and
ﬁnance research of the last few years has fundamentally challenged the
ways in which plan sponsors, retirement service providers, and policy-
makers should think about retirement plan design in the future. At the
most inclusive level, behavioral research offers several new insights about
the nature of individual decisionmaking in retirement plans, which we enu-
merate next. After noting these, we turn to several plan design and policy
responses to this new body of research.
1. One lesson is that behavioral research challenges some of the most central
assumptions of decisionmaking. In particular, it challenges the notion that
workers are rational, autonomous, microcalculators who exercise independ-
ent and unbiased judgment when it comes to their workplace retirement
plans. The evidence suggests that people do strive to maximize their self-
interest, but for a variety of reasons outlined here, they often fail to act in
accordance with the expectations of rational economic and ﬁnancial the-
ory, in both the accumulation and decumulation phases. Some people
have self-control problems when it comes to saving; such individuals could
beneﬁt from commitment devices. Others simply overdiscount the future
and overvalue the present; such people could beneﬁt from precommit-
ment pension savings programs. Still others might be unduly inﬂuenced by
defaults and inertia: as a result, their attitudes and action diverge so they
very much want to save more for retirement, but they do not. Here too, pre-
commitment devices can plan an important role. Also, some individuals
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do not appear to evaluate their investment portfolios in mean–variance
terms; that is, past performance and risk errors cloud their judgment. They
are overconﬁdent about the future and have trouble cutting their losses.
Some trade too much, think “too small” in terms of gains and losses, and
take lump sums when in fact all of these behaviors increase rather than
reduce risk.
2. Another lesson learned is that plan design drives participant decisions, often
in unanticipated ways. Behavioral ﬁnance and economics also challenge the
notion that pension plan design is a neutral vehicle within which particip-
ants make their own choices independently. Because of default, framing,
and inertia effects, we have argued that the design of a retirement system
or plan has a profound effect on participant investment and saving deci-
sions. Sponsors and policymakers can alter behavior in fundamental ways
by choosing different default structures. In particular, the design decisions
to set up automatic enrollment, automatic saving, or default investment
programs, which makes some saving and investment decisions automatic,
are particularly critical.
Using traditional policy and plan design language, DC plans are
“employee directed,” with employees seen as the active agents while the
employer is thought to play a minimal decisionmaking role. In some sense
this is a libertarian decisionmaking model, where independent agents can
act to maximize their personal welfare within the constraints of the system.
But behavioral research sketches a different picture of many workers.
These are people with weak or uncertain preferences about basic questions
as how much to save, or how much risk to take. Plan design decisions then
emit powerful signals about “appropriate” employee behavior, and
employer/policymaker design speciﬁcations trump independent decision-
making. Such an environment is consistent with the “paternalistic libertari-
anism” notion advanced by Thaler and Sunstein (2003), where individuals
can be offered choice, but paternalistic elements of retirement plan design
play a powerful role in shaping the choices offered.
3. A third ﬁnding is that the standard approach taken in most contemporary DC
plans may be counterproductive in encouraging retirement saving. Generally,
participants are told that (i) saving for retirement is optional (since joining
the plan is discretionary); (ii) the need to increase saving over time is
optional (it requires a voluntary election by the worker); and (iii) investing
for retirement should focus on principal stability, rather than taking on risk
or balancing the portfolio (since the default fund in most retirement sav-
ings plans is a conservative ﬁxed income option). It is interesting that
employers and policymakers rely on a model of voluntary choice by the
worker in retirement saving plans, although they do not do so in other
components of workplace beneﬁts programs. Here, a comparison is
instructive between employer retirement saving plans and health insur-
ance. In terms of health plan participation, it has been uncommon for
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a US employer offering health insurance to allow employees to drop coverage
altogether (particularly without proof of some other health insurance).
Employers also regularly make decisions about healthcare plan coverage
levels and, for example, types of procedures and catastrophic coverage,
rather than leaving such choices to voluntary election by the worker.
Perhaps this is because lack of healthcare coverage might be felt immedi-
ately in the workplace if a worker became ill, while low levels of retirement
saving have no immediate consequence. If this is true, employers may be
subject to the same type of “hyperbolic discounting” as many workers, over-
valuing present-day risks, and overdiscounting future concerns.
4. A fourth lesson is that the current education model in 401(k) plans may have
reached its effective limits. Accompanying the growth of participant-directed
DC retirement plans has been a large expansion in the provision of work-
place education. Much of the educational effort has been motivated by
nondiscrimination testing—employers have an incentive to encourage
plan use among lower-paid employees, to allow highly paid employees
greater ability to contribute to the plan. Other motivations have been
employers’ desires to promote a popular saving beneﬁt, and to minimize
ﬁduciary liability for participant investment decisions. The current educa-
tional model tends to emphasize communication and education activities,
both of which are aimed at producing behavioral change (e.g. joining the
plan, boosting saving, investing more effectively). Yet, the behavioral litera-
ture suggests that for many workers, this model is limited in its applicability.
There is the problem of inertia, which we have described as the divergence
between desire and effective action. There is also the notion that only part
of the workforce is motivated to learn about personal ﬁnances or interested
in using ﬁnancial education. Contemporary education practices assume
that most workers are rational agents and planners, but the evidence we
offer suggests that large numbers of workers simply are not.
As Selnow (Chapter 2, this volume) suggests, an alternative model is that
desired behavior must precede education. Mechanisms must be found,
whether through plan defaults or delegation to a third party, where workers
begin practicing the right behaviors at the outset. Education then can play
an ancillary role, explaining the rationale for the defaults and alternative
courses of future action. In effect, behavioral economics suggest a reversal
in the causality of education: A shift from education driving behavioral
change, to initial behavioral change preceding education.
These broad themes—imperfect investors and savers, the critical role of
system design, a new model for education—suggest a number of policy and
plan design choices. Four issues deserve prominent attention:
1. Much depends on the DC arrangement in DC plans. One way to exploit
the ﬁndings of this rich new behavioral literature would be to alter the
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nature of default decisionmaking in US retirement saving plans. Inertia,
procrastination, and lack of decisionmaking willpower can be exploited to
encourage more retirement saving. An “auto-pilot” 401(k) is one possibil-
ity. Also automatic enrollment of all eligible employees; scheduled annual
savings increases (as in the Save More Tomorrow plan); and a selection of
default investment choices that represent optimal portfolio choices, such
as a series of age-based balanced portfolios. In this way, the passive deci-
sionmaker may rely on system design to reach a near-optimal retirement
outcome. While workers will still retain the right to “opt out” of this
arrangement, allowing for freedom of choice, the system design always
directs workers toward desirable saving and investment behaviors.
Auto-pilot 401(k) solutions are not without their drawbacks: Most
notably, the automatic enrollment of employees will raise costs above the
current model where workers must opt in (e.g. higher employer matching
contributions, higher administrative costs for employers and providers).
Offsetting these costs, in part, could be the greater asset pool resulting
from higher contribution rates over time, as well as higher-fee investments
as default options. Just as employees are easily inﬂuenced by employer plan
design decisions, so employers are inﬂuenced by implicit and explicit poli-
cymaker directions. Currently, clear-cut regulatory guidance exists only for
automatic enrollment components; to generalize this success, some type of
regulatory or statutory endorsement for automatic saving and age-based
investment choices would be required. A further consideration, of course,
is whether the auto-pilot 401(k) model would be an alternative to existing
nondiscrimination testing requirements. From a policy perspective,
nondiscrimination testing rules were introduced to ensure that low-paid
workers take sufﬁcient advantage of tax-deferred retirement savings plans,
and that tax beneﬁts of such plans did not accrue solely to the highly paid.
An auto-pilot 401(k), perhaps with some standardized eligibility and
matching contributions (as in today’s “safe harbor” design), might accom-
plish the same objective in a different way. It would offer other beneﬁts
for lower-paid workers as well—including automatic retirement savings
increases and better portfolio choices for many.
2. Simpliﬁed menu design in retirement plans could be very useful. One of the
more practical conclusions from behavioral ﬁnance is that investment menu
design must be closely scrutinized. Iyengar, Huberman, and Jiang (Chapter 5,
this volume) describe the “choice overload” hypothesis in detail: Complex
investment menus may discourage plan participation. But it is also clear that
even simple pension design decisions, such as the composition of equity
versus ﬁxed income funds, can also strongly inﬂuence participant invest-
ment behavior. Certainly, one implication from the research is that many
participants lack skills needed to make complex investment choices among
highly differentiated options. There is little evidence that participants
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are constructing the mean–variance optimal portfolios that employers use
to justify the inclusion of different investment classes, styles, and managers.
Instead they use informal heuristics, including past performance, to make
choices.
As a result, the research suggests that the “laundry list” approach to
investment options—where workers are given 50 or 100 choices of funds—
will be confusing and demotivating for some. Accordingly, plan sponsors
might experiment with tiered investment choices, where communication
resources are devoted to educating participants about a limited menu of
core options, and additional choices for sophisticated investors could be
segregated from the core menu.
More broadly, both employers and policymakers need to rethink the
trend toward expanding the myriad and complex active saving decisions
presented to workers. Behavioral research suggests that there are natural,
inevitable limits to a policy of ever-increasing choices and decisions. For
example, tax legislation in 2001 authorized an after-tax version of 401(k)
saving plans (dubbed a “Roth” provision, in which contributions are made
after-tax and all future earnings and distributions are tax-free). The idea is
that employers could offer employees a choice between pre- and post-tax
savings in the same plan. The Administration has also recently proposed to
create a system of after-tax personal saving accounts which compete with
pre-tax workplace saving plans. Whatever the merits of these proposals, it
seems likely that adding new choices will further complicate investment
and saving decisions. Since the evidence suggests that many workers
already struggle with the basic decisions to save, invest, and spend during
retirement, it seems likely that new options will further challenge already-
burdened decisionmakers.
3. New approaches are needed to help workers and retirees better manage company
stock risk. Congress and employers have attempted to address the risks
of holding excessive company stock through education and educational/
disclosure activities, yet the behavioral evidence suggests that this strategy
will have limited impact. One problem is inertia; reducing concentrated
stock positions requires taking a disciplined approach to selling stock hold-
ings, but few participants tend to follow such a self-motivated, disciplined
approach to managing their saving due to inertia and procrastination.
Another problem is risk perceptions and the inﬂuence of past returns with
company stock. Employees signiﬁcantly underestimate the risks of their
own company’s stock, and they are also unduly and erroneously inﬂuenced
by past stock performance. The ﬁndings regarding overconﬁdence and
aversion to realizing losses may also come into play with company stock.
When workers have too rosy a view of the future but have trouble selling
their company stock at a loss, it is unlikely that providing additional informa-
tion will quickly alter these attitudes and produce changes in investment
portfolios.
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As in the auto-pilot 401(k) case, one policy option would be to provide
employees with an optional statutory mechanism that automatically reduces
their exposure to company stock to a given percentage that declined with
age (e.g. 20 percent or 10 percent of assets by age 65). For example, a plan
might offer a provision that drew down the participant’s position steadily
each quarter over some prescribed period, say 3 or 5 years. In other
words, participants may need a precommitment device that works automatic-
ally for them as they near retirement, a concept dubbed as the “sell more
tomorrow” idea by the originators of the “Save More Tomorrow” plan.
4. Sensible plan design includes default choices at retirement. Current policy
has permitted the conversion of pensions from plans that pay life annuities,
into programs that give workers a choice to receive their lifelong saving in
a lump sum at retirement. Behavioral research suggests that annuity versus
lump sum decisions at retirement could be better framed, taking into
account participants’ understanding of mortality versus investment risks.
One question has to do with what should be the default choice. In DB
plans, the default has traditionally been an annuity, though more plans are
now offering lump sum options. In DC plans, the default is generally a
lump sum, with no annuity option. An alternative approach might be to
frame the default as some mixture of annuity and lump sum, rather than as
an either–or decision. Of course, it would be essential to ensure that the
two options are compared on an “apples-to-apples” basis to avoid fram-
ing bias. To better preserve the longevity protection that pensions once
offered, policymakers may ﬁnd it sensible to make annuitization the
default, and to make loans against the pension accruals more difﬁcult to
obtain.
In sum, this research overview on behavioral decisionmaking ﬁnds
important and valuable new insights into how plan sponsors, beneﬁt plan
consultants, and policymakers must rethink pension plan design in this
new century. It seems clear that participants can be better served, when
they make the hard decisions to accumulate and decumulate retirement
assets. It is because retirement saving decisions are, at least an order of
magnitude, more complex than other economic decisions, that people
need help. The thought process requires a sequence of critical savings and
investment decisions over a lifetime, backed by a complex and ongoing
forecast of needs and resources. It should not be surprising, then, that for a
substantial segment of the workforce, this task proves daunting and dis-
couraging. And for some people, the problem may be so complex that they
are forced to rely on decision heuristics that simplify decisionmaking, but
may not necessarily produce appropriate outcomes. While much has been
learned, a central question remains: How can the various stakeholders
strike the best balance between encouragement and compulsion? What sys-
tem can both preserve participant decisionmaking while offering limits on
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choice, so as to encourage the outcomes that rational and forward thinking
consumers would want for themselves? This volume offers much to inform
the debate.
Notes
1 For a recent review see Kahneman and Tversky (2000); Mullainathan and
Thaler (2000); Shefrin (2003) and Barberis and Thaler (2002). For a review of
retirement and portfolio implications, see also Statman (Chapter 4, this volume),
Duﬂo and Saez (Chapter 8, this volume), and Choi et al. (Chapter 7, this volume).
2 Indeed the 2002 Nobel Prize in economics awarded to Daniel Kahneman and
Vernon Smith, recognized the far-reaching importance of this shift in paradigm.
The Prize Committee noted “[t]raditionally, much of economic research has relied
on the assumption of a ‘homo œconomicus’ motivated by self-interest and capable
of rational decisionmaking. Economics has also been widely considered a non-
experimental science, relying on observation of real-world economies rather than
controlled laboratory experiments. Nowadays, however, a growing body of research
is devoted to modifying and testing basic economic assumptions . . . This research
has its roots in two distinct, but currently converging, areas: The analysis of human
judgment and decisionmaking by cognitive psychologists, and the empirical testing
of predictions from economic theory by experimental economists.” (www.mea.uni.
mannheim.de/winter/lehre/03-ss/behav.htm)
3 Aizcorbe, Kennickell, and Moore (2003) summarize results from the 2001
Survey of Consumer Finances, and he ﬁnds for example, age-related ﬂuctuations in
net worth, ﬁnancial assets, and debt consistent with the life-cycle hypothesis.
4 There are methodological or substantive caveats regarding this research, yet on
the whole the research does indicate that at least some households are not particu-
larly good at solving the retirement saving problem. Hurd and Rohwedder (2003)
ﬁnd, for example, that households anticipate a 20% drop in consumption, and so
the decline in retiree consumption may be rationally anticipated, not unexpected.
One concern about Bernheim et al. (2001) is that it uses data on food consumption
(both in and out of the home) as a proxy for total consumption.
5 See also Loewenstein and Prelec (1992), Laibson (1997), and Frederick,
Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue (2002). As Thaler recalls, doubts among eco-
nomists about the consistency of individual time preferences dates back at least
to Robert Strotz, who in the mid-1950s wrote that “special attention should be
given . . . to a discount function . . . [that] ‘overvalues’ the more proximate satis-
faction relative to the more distant ones . . . .” (cited in Thaler, 1981: 127).
6 Two examples are drawn from insurance and healthcare (Thaler and Sunstein,
2003). In the United States, in the state of New Jersey, the default option under the
state’s car insurance regulations offers workers a limited right to sue for damages
(with a lower insurance premium). In the neighboring state of Pennsylvania, the
default is the regular right to sue; to obtain the limited right to sue and the lower pre-
mium, the car driver must make a positive election. In New Jersey, 20% of individuals
retain the full right to sue, which requires a positive election, while in Pennsylvania,
75% retain the full right to sue, which is the default. Similarly, the donation of vital
organs upon one’s death is common in a number of European countries, with over
90% of individuals donating organs; yet, it is comparatively rare in the United States,
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with less than 20% making organ donations. In the European countries, organ
donation is the default; in the United States, it requires a positive election.
7 Goetzman and Kumar (2001), De Bondt (1998).
8 See Thaler and Johnson (1990) for a discussion of break-even thinking and the
house money effect.
9 See Arkes et al. (1995), Odean (1998a), Svenson (1981), Tiger (1979), and
Weinstein (1980). Taylor and Brown (1988) point out that overoptimism offers
psychological beneﬁts as well.
10 For an overview of the overconﬁdence literature, particularly on the ability of
individuals to calibrate their forecasts, see Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, and Phillips
(1982). Odean (1998a,b) also summarizes ﬁndings on overconﬁdence.
11 Shefrin (2003) summarizes both these conclusions from De Bondt (1998) and
related literature on overconﬁdence in investing.
12 It may be worth noting that opting for a lump sum permits retirees to avoid
using the unisex mortality tables required by law for employee beneﬁt plans. This
could be an appealing result for those who anticipate living less long than the com-
bined male/female life expectancy. Taking the lump sum and spending it also
makes the near-poor retiree more likely to be eligible for social welfare beneﬁts
payable to the indigent.
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